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I 
One of the most baffling problems considered by Aristotle in his Physics is the nature of time. Does time 
exist in any robust sense? If it does, what is its essence? A promising, if only partial, solution to this aporia seems to 
be the connection between time and soul. Aristotle begins by rejecting the identification of time with notions such as 
movement, especially the movement of the sphere of fixed stars (218a30 ff., 223b21 ff.) and he thoroughly excludes 
the possibility that time is identical with the outermost celestial sphere. His resistance to theories that reify time 
(theories presumably cherished by the Pythagoreans and by Plato) is indeed in keeping with the privileged place he 
assigns to mind or intellect (nous) in his discussion of time. In modern terms, Aristotle denies that time can 
characterize physical events independently of conceptualizing percipients. The problem is formulated squarely in 
Physics Δ 14, 223a21-29, where he appeals to a counterfactual in order to show that without soul there could be no 
time: 
Whether time would exist or not if soul did not exist (mē ousēs psuchēs), is a question that may fairly be 
asked; for if there cannot be someone to count (tou arithmēsontos) there cannot be anything that can be 
counted, so that evidently there cannot be number; for number is either what has been counted or what is 
countable (arithmēton). But if nothing but soul, or in soul reason (psuchēs nous), is qualified to count, there 
would not be time unless there were soul, but only that of which time is an attribute, i.e. if movement can 
exist without soul, and the before and after pertain to movement, and time is these qua countable 
(arithmēta).1 
 
The existence of time appears to hinge on two factors: the occurrence of changes and the possibility that 
those changes may be perceived by some soul. Troubled by the lines I am referring to, Ross notes that “since the 
discussion is very brief and Aristotle nowhere recurs to the subject, we need not suppose that he attached much 
importance to the answer he gives.” (1966, p. 68) Ross’ remark is the paradigmatic case for a blanket dismissal of 
Aristotle’s mind-dependence theory of time, as a sort of whimsical afterthought. Other commentators (Owen, for 
instance) prefer to tacitly avoid the difficulties raised by the incriminated Physics passage.2 Fortunately, however, 
more recently there has been a steady tendency to take Aristotle’s mind-dependence theory of time very much in 
earnest (e.g. Conen 1964, 156-68; Annas 1975, 97-113; Sorabji 1983, 84-94; Bolotin 1997, 47-62).  
The chief goal of my paper is to reconsider a crucial ingredient of his theory – that figures quite 
prominently in that celebrated passage in Ch. 14 - namely the notion of ‘number’, and to emphasize the fact that 
Aristotle's view on the relation between mind and the existence of time is far from being grounded solely on that 
passage. 
 
II 
 Aristotle’s use of ‘number’ remains a particularly puzzling feature of his account of time. While Plato 
assigned independent existence to numbers, Aristotle insisted that numbers have no reality independently of mental 
operations like counting. As Annas convincingly demonstrates, Physics Δ, 10-14 agrees in broad lines with 
Metaphysics M and N (as well as with aspects of Met. I) where Aristotle thoroughly rejects Plato’s standpoint on 
mathematical objects. He maintains that “the objects of mathematics are not substances in a higher degree than 
bodies are” and that “they cannot exist somewhere apart” (1077b11 ff.; cf. 1076a38 ff., 1077b5 ff.). 
Indeed these lines may indicate one of the main reasons why Aristotle chose ‘number’ (arithmos) as the 
key-term in his definition of time (“time is the number of change / motion with respect to the before and after”, 
219b2). In the light of Metaphysics M and N, it is sensible to suppose that time was defined as ‘number’, among 
other reasons, in order to draw our attention to the somewhat fragile ontological condition of time, similar to that of 
mathematical objects. Just like numbers, time, according to Aristotle, is not to be thought of as having any existence 
                                                
1 My quotations from the Physics follow the translation made by Hardie and Gaye (in McKeon 1941), with slight modifications. 
2 For a brief description of the various approaches to those lines in Ch. 14, see Conen 1964, 156-68. 
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apart from mental operations - or apart from the possibility of performing such operations (as well as from change, 
in the case of time). 
Aristotle’s treatment of the concept of ‘number’ is certainly complex and intricate and, on occasion, it even 
appears to be slightly inconsistent (there is, for example, a certain hesitation between taking time to be numerus 
numeratus and considering it a numerus numerans). One crucial facet of his treatment is the connection between 
time and measure. Annas, more than others, draws our attention to the semantic similarity of ‘number’ and 
‘measure’ in the Physics account of time and champions the thesis that ‘number’ and ‘measure’ are used by Aristotle 
virtually interchangeably. She ingeniously founds her argumentation on the first three chapters of Metaphysics I and 
notes that "whereas we regard it as natural to think of measurement as applied arithmetic, Aristotle regards counting 
as a kind of pure measuring." (Annas 1975, 100) true enough, the distinction between the two concepts is by no 
means easy to make: if we distinguish - or ‘number’ - equal temporal segments and use them as a sort of yardsticks, 
we can ‘measure’ the span of a certain movement.  
I believe, however, that ‘number’ and ‘measure’ are at most partially synonymous in the account of time. 
One should be mindful of the distinction suggested by the functional distribution of the terms ‘to count’ / ‘number’ 
(arithmein / arithmos) and ‘to measure’ / ‘measure’ (metrein / metron) in Physics Δ. For example, it is quite seldom 
that one is said to ‘measure’ movements or time3, rather than to ‘count’ different stages in a movement. There are 
somewhat more passages in the Physics in which time itself is said to ‘measure’4 motion. Nevertheless, ‘measure’ is 
primarily and consistently used in reference to motion - to motion in general5 and more particularly to the circular 
motion of the outermost celestial sphere (whose regular and unfailing rotation provides the ultimate ‘measure’ for 
everything).6 The verb ‘to count’ is not used even once in reference to the ‘heavenly clock’, the sphere of the fixed 
stars, which is only said to measure time. ‘Number’, on the other hand, is always used with regard to time, to the 
‘now’7 or to our perception of change. For example, in 223a21-29 (the passage on mind as a prerequisite for the 
existence of time) there are eight occurrences of arithmos and various derivative forms, while there is no occurrence 
at all of metron or metrein. 
The concept of ‘number’, unlike that of ‘measure’, is also employed in order to emphasize the unity of 
time: if we consider two groups of different beings – say ten horses and ten dogs, the same number, ten, is 
applicable to both groups. Similarly, several movements can occur simultaneously in the same time / ‘number’.8 In 
such contexts, ‘measure’ becomes relevant in one’s comparing a certain temporal segment (or rather a change that 
‘covers’ that span) to an ongoing change, and in thus determining how much motion, for instance, has taken place.9 
Conversely, time itself can be ‘measured’ if the unit of measurement we take into account is a given ‘amount’ of 
change. As I have already mentioned, the motion of the outermost celestial sphere provides the most reliable unit for 
measuring time.10 But motion is never said, not even metaphorically, to count time or anything else.  
Multiple distinctions between ‘number’ and ‘measure’, ‘counting’ and ‘measuring’ emerge thus clearly. 
Unlike ‘measure’, ‘number’ is essential to the nature of time. ‘Counting’ often concerns an intellectual operation, 
namely the discernment between different moments or phases in a change – a point that I am going to further 
elaborate in the next section of my paper. Also, the entire Chapter 11, centered on the definition of time does show – 
from an empirical standpoint - that the existence of time depends on ‘counting’, not on measuring.  
While this correspondence (rather than interchangeability, as Annas puts it) between number and measure, 
counting and measuring, is hard to deny in several passages, it is stressed by Annas to such an extent that other, 
equally important aspects of Aristotle’s treatment of the concept of time are almost ignored.  
 
III 
                                                
3 E.g. 220b15 – metroumen. 
4 E.g. 220b3 ff., 221b7 f. 
5 220b14 ff. etc. 
6 E.g. 223b32 f. 
7 E.g. 220a20 f. 
8 224a2 ff., cf. 220a27 ff. 
9 220b32-221a3. 
10 When we notice some change in the sublunary world, we are at least theoretically able to compare that change with the pace of 
the sphere of the fixed stars. Thus we have a standard by means of which we can determine the span and speed of any movement 
that our senses grasp. As Thomas Aquinas puts it, “whoever perceives any motion, either existing in sensible things or in the 
soul, perceives the first motion from which time follows.” (257) 
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Aristotle spends considerable effort trying to make it clear, throughout chapter 11 for example, that our 
perception of change or movement is pivotal to the nature of time. The definition of time, including the reference to 
number, stems precisely from a long set of passages and suggesting illustrations that focus on our awareness of 
becoming. Initially Aristotle strives to demonstrate that there cannot be any time without change. It becomes clear, 
however, that a second precondition for the existence of time is intertwined with this first one: namely, the possible 
presence of souls able to discern the various phases of a change (in subsequent passages Aristotle will say in the 
same vein that time must be countable if it is to be time indeed): 
(…) When the state of our minds does not change at all, or we have not noticed its changing, we do not 
realize that time has gone by (ou dokei hēmin gegonenai chronos), any more than those who are fabled to 
sleep among the heroes in Sardinia do when they are awakened; for they connect the earlier ‘now’ with the 
later and make them one, cutting the interval because of their failure to notice it. (…) If, then, the non-
realization of the existence of time happens to us when we do not distinguish any change, but the soul 
seems to stay in one indivisible state, and when we perceive and distinguish we say that time has elapsed, 
evidently time is not independent of (ouk estin aneu) movement and change. (218b20-219a1) 
 
In a way Ch. 11 prepares the ground for the apparently radical claim made in Ch. 14, where Aristotle 
contends that there cannot be time in the absence of any entity capable of perceiving change (more technically: of 
'counting'). It is important to note that the references to our perception of change, made repeatedly in Ch. 11 and 
later on, are not simply a propaedeutic maneuver meant to lead the listener / reader from what is more knowable to 
us towards what is more knowable in nature (i.e. to the real nature of time). Indeed such persistent references allude 
rather transparently to the fact that our perception of change is constitutive to the very nature of time, to its 
ontological condition (and this, of course, is made thoroughly clear in Ch. 14, 223a21-29). Let me quote the passage 
in Ch. 11 that includes the definition of time: 
When, therefore, we perceive the ‘now’ as one, and neither as before and after in a motion nor as an 
identity but in relation to a ‘before’ and an ‘after’, no time is thought to have elapsed, because there has 
been no motion either. On the other hand, when we do perceive a ‘before’ and an ‘after’, then we say that 
there is time. For time is just this: number in respect of ‘before’ and ‘after’ (arithmos kinēseōs kata to 
proteron kai husteron). (219a30-219b2) 
 
From Aristotle’s formulation, it is reasonably clear that the definition of time rests firmly on the numerous remarks 
he made about our perception of change. It should be plausible, then, to affirm that the reality of time depends on the 
occurrence of change(s) in the physical world as well as on our capacity to discern various stages in any change we 
observe. If the definition of time, centered on the notion of ‘number’, is tightly bound up with what precedes, then 
‘number’ and ‘counting’ are not always necessarily interchangeable with ‘measure’ and ‘measurement’, but are also 
intended to direct our attention to our awareness of becoming. Aristotle’s attention turns to ‘measure’ and 
‘measuring’, underlining the ‘instrumental’ aspect of time, only after spelling out what time is essentially. And even 
after the enunciation of what time is Aristotle often resorts to ‘number’ and ‘counting’ in a manner that hardly 
evokes any measurement. (E.g. 219b28: “…It is in so far as the ‘before and after’ is countable that we get the 
‘now’.)  
 Thus number appears here to signify the multiplicity of various stages, like the various segments of a film, 
in contrast to the oneness of an instant (‘now’), static and comparable with a single picture, or, rather, with a point 
on a line. To judge by the considerations that precede the definition of time, ‘counting’ chiefly conveys our capacity 
to distinguish between different moments (or stages in a movement).  
The notion of nun (‘now’) acquires much weight here (like several other terms belonging to what 
McTaggart famously called the “flowing series”). It is certainly impossible to count ‘nows’ stricto sensu, on 
Aristotle’s account, since there are infinitely many ‘nows’ between any two cross-sections in the flux of time, which 
is a continuum. In other words, since time is not a string of definite temporal items or time-atoms, we cannot 
properly count durationless ‘nows’. At the same time, our perception of any change (the distinction between ‘before’ 
and ‘after’) unavoidably entails our awareness of the immediate present. Aristotle does not explain for us in a 
satisfactory way what makes our awareness of the immediate present (and of our own perception of becoming - a 
faculty presumably requiring nous) even possible, if a ‘now’ is durationless. It may be the case that in certain 
passages he uses ‘now’ in a loose manner and assigns some duration to it – a point made persuasively by Bolotin in 
his 1997 paper.  
Comparing Aristotle with contemporary thinkers is often a tempting but potentially perilous enterprise. 
Nonetheless, I will venture, however, to note that Aristotle’s view on time seems to agree basically with Adolf 
Grünbaum’s, among other contemporary philosophers. Grünbaum writes that: 
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My characterization of present happening or occurring now is intended to deny that belonging to the 
present is a physical attribute of a physical event E which is independent of any judgemental awareness of 
the occurrence of either E itself or of another simultaneously with it. (1971, p. 209)  
 
The mind-dependent character of becoming has been intensely debated by contemporary thinkers. Adolf 
Grünbaum’s paper on The meaning of time (1971) - although of course it is not intended at all as a commentary on 
the Physics – shares, I believe, a few important points with Aristotle’s theory. Grünbaum notes that:  
Becoming is mind-dependent because it is not an attribute of physical events per se but requires the 
occurrence of certain conceptualized conscious experiences of the occurrence of physical events (p. 197). 
(cf. Bolotin 1997 passim) 
 
Thus it seems to me that Aristotle’s theory of time is worth pondering not only from a historical 
perspective, but also for the very density of its philosophical core, as it becomes clear that the aporiai Aristotle was 
at grips with still deserve attentive scrutiny nowadays. What I have hoped to convey today is that Aristotle’s mind-
dependence theory of time does not rest on only one passage, but on relatively large sections of Physics Δ (esp. Ch. 
11), and that his appeal to the notion of number (arithmos) fulfils a cluster of functions, one of them being to 
emphasize that our awareness of becoming (in addition to change itself) is a fundamental condition for the existence 
of time. In short, (contrary to what e.g. Annas notes – p. 108) the very marking off of different nows can amount to 
‘counting’, even without resort to any temporal unit of measure. 
 
IV 
Now, if time depends for its existence not only on the occurrence of changes, but also on our capacity of 
perceiving changes and if indeed ‘counting’ is not always interchangeable with ‘measuring’ but can also signify our 
ability to discern between various stages in a movement or change, there remains one more point that I would like to 
signal here, rather than solve in any peremptory fashion. The problem that I would like to address now, at the end of 
my presentation, is whether, according to Physics Δ 10-14, other animals than human beings are able to perceive 
temporal becoming, to distinguish between different ‘nows’ and the spans delimited by them.11 In other words, the 
question has to be answered whether time is anthropocentric in any significant way in Physics Δ. In the first part of 
Ch. 1112 Aristotle uses only examples explicitly pertaining to the human nature. At 223a21 ff. (the crucial passage in 
Ch. 14), however, he does not refer specifically to humans, but rather vaguely to “what (who) will count (or: is able 
to count)”; in Greek: tou arithmēsontos. He is convinced nonetheless that only the soul, and in soul reason, is able to 
count (223a25). What is the point in making this qualification? 
 For Aristotle, thought or reason is an attribute of man13 and in a peculiar way, of God. So, according to this 
passage, there should be only two types of beings capable of perceiving time. Yet, if God thought of whatever 
pertains to the sensible world, God would no longer be eternal and unchangeable in every respect. To presume that 
Aristotle’s God perceives time would entail serious difficulties and would conflict with Metaphysics Λ, in which the 
prime mover is considered to be the sole object of his own thought.14  
Does Physics Δ suggest that humans are the only beings able to perceive time? If the right answer is yes, 
and if it is a reasonable enterprise to contrast the Physics with De memoria in certain respects, I would like to point 
out a possible inconsequence in Aristotle. In several passages of De memoria, memory is said to be “a function of 
the primary faculty of sense-perception, i.e. of that faculty whereby we perceive time.”15 And also: “Hence not only 
human beings and the beings which possess opinion or intelligence, but also certain other animals possess 
memory.”16 Memory, just like the perception of time, is basically a function of the “primary faculty of sense-
                                                
11 Verbeke is positive about this (118): “Notons d’abord que la perception du temps ne se limite pas aux hommes: comme elle se 
rattache au sens commun, elle se rencontre aussi chez certains animaux.” 
12 218b20-219b2. 
13 See De anima 414b18-21 (“Certain kinds of animals possess in addition the power of locomotion, and still another order of 
animate beings, i.e. man and possibly another order like man or superior to him, the power of thinking, i.e. mind.” Trans. J.A. 
Smith); cf. Metaph. 980b ff, where the term used is logismos. Parts of Animals I.1, 641b8: “..other animals than man have the 
power of locomotion, but in none but him is there intellect.” See also De anima 433a9-13, 427b7-8. 
14 One might also argue that psychē/nous refers in Physics Δ 14 not only to our souls/minds, but to the movers of the celestial 
spheres; I doubt, however, that this could amount to anything more than a mere hypothesis.  
15  451a15 ff. 
16  450a13 ff. 
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perception”. Sense-perception is of course shared by man and the other animals (cf. De anima 413b3 ff.). The 
implication of this fact is that, in De memoria, Aristotle does not deny at all that other animals can perceive time. 
But this seems to clash with the claim, in Physics Δ 14, that nous (and implicitly the ability to count) is a 
prerequisite for the existence of time.  
 If in Physics Δ it is only human beings that are deemed qualified to perceive time, then time curiously 
becomes ‘anthropocentric’. If Physics Δ10-14 is to be reconciled with the account of De memoria, then we have to 
assume that time, in Aristotle’s opinion, is simply liable to be perceived in several ways. But I prefer to confine 
myself only to posing this problem, rather than attempting to solve it in definitive fashion.  
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